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Scavenger: A Junk Mail Classification Program
Rohan V. Malkhare
ABSTRACT
The problem of junk mail, also called spam, has reached epic proportions and various
efforts are underway to fight spam. Junk mail classification using machine learning
techniques is a key method to fight spam. We have devised a machine learning algorithm
where features are created from individual sentences in the subject and body of a message
by forming all possible word-pairings from a sentence. Weights are assigned to the
features based on the strength of their predictive capabilities for spam/legitimate
determination. The predictive capabilities are estimated by the frequency of occurrence of
the feature in spam/legitimate collections as well as by application of heuristic rules.
During classification, total spam and legitimate evidence in the message is obtained by
summing up the weights of extracted features of each class and the message is classified
into whichever class accumulates the greater sum.

We compared the algorithm against the popular naïve-bayes algorithm (in [8]) and found
it’s performance exceeded that of naïve-bayes algorithm both in terms of catching spam
and for reducing false positives.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Junk mail, commonly known as spam, has become more than just a daily nuisance for
email users; it has become a national issue with newspapers regularly reporting on the
latest efforts to fight spam. Legislation and technology are the two main tools being used
to fight spam.

Content-based filtering is a key technological method to fight spam and numerous
learning techniques have been developed to implement content-based filtering, with the
naïve-bayes method ([8]) being the most popular. Most learning algorithms for spam
classification include three main steps:
1. A mechanism for extracting features from messages.
2. A mechanisn for assigning weights to the extracted features.
3. A mechanism for combining weights of extracted features to determine
whether the mail is spam.

Learning techniques use the word (or chains of words as in [9]) to implement step 1,
probability of features in spam/legitimate collections to implement step 2 and the naïvebayes theorem or some variant of the bayes rule to implement step 3.
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Although this approach creates an accurate system for catching spam, the continuing
problem of false positives prompts us to have a fresh look at each of the steps.

We have devised a machine learning algorithm that implements a unique mechanism for
each of the three steps. The algorithm (named ‘scavenger’) implements the three steps as:
1. Features are created from individual sentences in the subject and body of a
message by forming all possible word-pairings from a sentence.
2. Weights are assigned to the features based on the strength of their predictive
capabilities for spam/legitimate determination. This predictive strength is based
on the frequency of occurrence of the feature in spam/legitimate collections as
well as on heuristic rules.
3. During classification, total spam and legitimate evidence in the message is
obtained by summing up the weights of extracted features of each class. The
message is classified into whichever class accumulates the greater sum.

The bayes rule and it’s variants have become the most popular method for implementing
steps 2 and 3 in spam classification algorithms. We compared the algorithm against the
naïve-bayes algorithm given in [8] and found it’s performance exceeded that of the naïvebayes algorithm both in terms of catching spam and for reducing false positives.

We have implemented the algorithm as a filter running on a Windows PC. The filter
operates for individual email accounts of IMAP mail servers.
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Chapter 2 – Related Work
We shall restrict our focus to examining machine learning and text classification
techniques as applied to the problem of classifying junk mail.

Cohen [1] devised a Rule-learning system called RIPPER which automatically generated
“keyword-spotting” rules of the form

cs328 ← “utexas” ∈ from ∧ “utexas”

ε

to

The rule states that a message belongs to the folder cs328 if the word “utexas” appears in
both the from and to headers. The advantage of this system was that the rules were in a
human-readable format and they could be manually extended. However, Provost [2]
showed that classification accuracy of is very low as compared to statistical classification
algorithms.

Pantel and Lin [3] employed the naïve-bayes algorithm to classify messages as spam or
legitimate. Words were used as features of the messages and frequency counts of words
in spam and legitimate collections were used to generate probability of a word being in
spam and probability of a word being in a legitimate message. For classification, words
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were extracted from a message and the naïve-bayes method was used to calculate the
probabilities of the message being spam and legitimate.

Sahami et al [4] also used the naïve-bayes method but differed from Pantel and Lin in
their use of the mutual information measure as a feature selector to select words with the
strongest resolving power between spam and legitimate messages as well as their use of
domain-specific features of spam like specific phrases, overemphasized punctuation etc.
as attributes of a message.

Katirai [5] compared the genetic programming with naïve-bayes for spam classification
and discovered that while precision of classification was comparable to naïve-bayes,
recall for genetic programming was poor.

Carreras and Marquez [6] used the AdaBoost algorithm for filtering spam and found that
for a small corpus of emails, the performance of the AdaBoost algorithm is comparable to
naïve-bayes.

Paul Graham [8] described a simple implementation of the naïve-bayes algorithm where
probability of an email being a spam given a word occurrence is pre-calculated for each
word on a training set of spam and legitimate messages. The incoming message is parsed
and sorted out into fifteen words (or tokens) having the strongest probability that an
email containing that word is either spam or legitimate. These probabilities are then
combined using naïve-bayes method to give the probability of the email being spam.
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Yerazunis [9] has created a powerful feature extraction technique where the incoming
text is decomposed into short phrases of one to five words each while still maintaining
the order of the words. For each feature, frequency of occurrence of that feature in both
the spam and legitimate categories is counted and probabilities of spam and legitimate
messages containing that feature are assigned as weights of the feature. The Bayesian
chain rule is used to compute the probability of the mail being spam. Although the
algorithm gives a highly accurate spam filter, it is computationally too expensive ([9]) for
widespread implementation.

5

Chapter 3 – The Algorithm
3.1 Overview
Feature extraction is common to both the training and classification portions of the
algorithm. Assigning weights to extracted features is specific to training and combining
the weights of extracted features is specific to classification. Training consists of feature
extraction followed by weight assignment and classification consists of feature extraction
followed by combining the weights of extracted features.

3.2 Feature Extraction
For extraction of features, we use the ‘sentence’ of a message as the semantic unit and
decompose individual sentences of messages into all possible word-pairings. We define a
sentence as a series of words in a message delimited by either a ‘.’, ‘?’, ‘!’ , ‘;’ , ‘<’ or a
‘>’. If number of words becomes greater than a constant K, then we treat the group of K
words as a sentence. We have set the value of K to 20. Commonly occuring words are
skipped.

Consider the following sentence occuring in a legitimate message:

“There is a problem in the tables that are copied in the database.”
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We form pairs by combining 1st word with 2nd, 1st word with 3rd…….1st word with the
last word, 2nd word with the 3rd and so on. We also create pairs by reversing the order of
words i.e. create a pair where the 2nd word comes before 1st, 3rd word comes before 1st
and so on. Without considering the commonly occurring words, “problem tables”, “tables
problem”, “problem database”, “database problem” etc. are the pairs that would be
formed in the sentence above. Thus, if a sentence contains n words, then number of pairs
would be n.(n-1).

Instead of a sentence, we could use the complete message and create all possible pairs of
words from the message or use the sliding window scheme as detailed in Bill Yerazunis
CRM114 algorithm ( [9]). However, the number of features generated out of such a
scheme increases the computational complexity of the algorithm and makes it infeasible
to create a usable filter. For example, the CRM114 algorithm ([9]) would create 2^(n-1)
features from a sentence as compared to n.(n-1) features created by the ‘scavenger’
algorithm.

We have compiled a list of commonly occurring words and we skip a word if it is a part
of this list. These words are:

Hi hello dear regards thanks thank of into they she it been he in the how where microsoft
us than like ascii us-ascii urn schemas vml office word xmlns smarttags http content path
return hr no yes meta equiv border marginwidth marginheight leftmargin topmargin text
when which what from as a an out you I am are is was by to br rowspan colspan on at for
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to be our and but this that these many more all font face arial times verdana helvetica
span there not can could would will if has have why who had with your or any my we so
nbsp date content-type http-equiv width height from to reply-to subject fw fwd re mon
monday tue tuesday wed wednesday thu thursday fri Friday sat Saturday Sunday sun jan
feb mar apr may jun jul aug sep oct nov dec format flowed message charset td tr table
href valign top bottom align title body head cellspacing cellpadding img src alt target
class right left center div us-ascii http www return-path x-keywords content-disposition
received message-id html font content-id let make put seem take be do have say will
about among at between by down from in on over through to under up with as for of till
than all any every no other some such that this I he you who and because but or if
through while how when where why here again ever far near now out still there then well
almost even much not only quite so very please yes

Detailed steps for feature extraction are as follows:
1. The subject and body is extracted from the message. Only MIME parts having
content-type as ‘text’ or ‘message’ are used for extraction. This ignores
attachments.
2. Characters a-z, A-Z, 0-9, single quote and ‘$’ are used for formation of a word
whereas all other characters are treated as word separators. Uppercase letters are
converted to lower-case.
3. Sentences are created from the body and all possible pairs of words are created to
form the features. The entire text of the subject line is treated as one sentence. .
For HTML, the series of words within a tag (between ‘<’ and‘>’) is treated as a
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sentence. A URL (web address) in a message is treated as a separate sentence.
Commonly occurring words are skipped as are words which are composed of all
digits. They are, however, retained while parsing the subject.
4. Extracted features are stored in a hash table in memory.

3.3 Assignment of Weights
Weights represent predictive strength of a feature. Weights are assigned to features
depending on whether the feature is categorized as a ‘strong’ evidence or a ‘weak’
evidence.

The categorization of features into ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ pieces of evidence depends on the
frequency of occurrence of the feature in spam/legitimate collections, the exclusivity of
occurrence and on heuristic rules like the distance between words of the word pairing,
length of each word in the word pairing and whether the word-pairing is from a subject or
the body.

In Chapter 4, we experimentally determine the best choice of weights representing
‘strong’ and ‘weak’ evidences. Let us initially assume 0.9 as the weight representing
‘strong’ evidence and 0.1 as the weight representing ‘weak’ evidence.

Following criteria are used to determine ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ pieces of evidence:
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1. Phrases occurring exclusively in one collection are treated as 'strong' evidence.
For example, if the phrase ’medical director’ occurs even once in the legitimate
collection but not at all in the spam collection, then it is assigned a legitimate
weight of 0.9. For exclusively-occurring phrases in the spam collection, the count
must be at least 3 to be considered as ‘strong’ evidence. A count below 3 is
considered ‘weak’ evidence.
2. Experimentally, we observed that word pairs created from non-consecutive words
have a lower predictive strength than word pairs created from consecutive words.
Thus, a word-pair created from non-consecutive words is treated as a ‘strong’
evidence only if it occurs with sufficient frequency. We form a rule where a
word-pair created from non-consecutive words is treated as a ‘strong’ evidence
only if the percentage of frequency of it’s occurrence is at least 10% of the
highest occurring frequency of word pairs.
3. Experimentally, we observed that if length of both the words in the pair is greater
than 5, the pair is most likely a good predictor of the class. Such pairs are treated
as ‘strong’ evidence.
4. All word pairs created from the subject of messages are treated as ‘strong’
evidence.

For better clarity, the assignment of weights to features is described by the pseudo-code
below:
maxoccurspam = highest occurring count of an exclusively occurring feature in spam
collection.
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maxoccurlegit = highest occurring count of an exclusively occurring feature in legit
collection.

For each feature in hash table
{
if((feature.legitimateCount = 0)AND(feature.spamcount <> 0)) // exclusive in spam
{
feature.legitimateWeight = 0;

if((strlen(feature.firstword) > 5) AND (strlen(feature.secondword) > 5))
feature.spamWeight = 0.9; // strong evidence
elseif ( isSubject(feature)) // feature occurs in subject of a message
feature.spamWeight=0.9; // strong evidence
elseif (feature.spamCount > = 3)
{
if(isConsecutive(feature)) // feature is a consecutive-word pairing
feature.spamWeight = 0.9; //strong evidence
elseif( feature.spamcount > 0.1 * maxoccurspam) //greater than 10% of max
feature.spamWeight = 0.9; // strong evidence
else
feature.spamWeight = 0.1; // weak evidence
}
else
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feature.spamWeight = 0.1; // weak evidence
}

if((feature.legitimateCount <> 0)AND(feature.spamcount = 0)) // exclusive in legit
{
feature.spamWeight = 0;

if((strlen(feature.firstword) > 5) AND (strlen(feature.secondword) > 5))
feature.legitimateWeight = 0.9; // strong evidence
elseif ( isSubject(feature)) // feature occurs in subject of a message
feature. legitimateWeight=0.9; // strong evidence
elseif (feature. legitimateCount > = 1)
{
if(isConsecutive(feature)) // feature is a consecutive-word pairing
feature. legitimateWeight = 0.9; //strong evidence
elseif( feature. legitimatecount > 0.1 * maxoccurlegit) //greater than 10% of max
feature. legitimateWeight = 0.9; // strong evidence
else
feature. legitimateWeight = 0.1; // weak evidence
}
else
feature. legitimateWeight = 0.1; // weak evidence
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}
}
3.4 Combining Weights
During classification, the total legitimate and spam evidence in the message is obtained
by extracting features from the message, matching them with features collected during
the training phase and summing up the weights of the matching features.

Total spam evidence = sum of spam feature weights.
Total legitimate evidence = sum of legitimate feature weights.

If total spam evidence >= M* total legitimate evidence,
then the mail is classified as a spam mail, else it is a legitimate mail.

We should note here that repeats of extracted features are ignored.

The constant M can have any value between 0.5 and 2.5 and can be used as a trade-off
between the number of false positives and number of uncaught spam mails for individual
email accounts.

The algorithm can be easily extended to include headers of messages. For headers, it is
useful for the feature extraction technique to extract just words as features. Algorithm can
also be extended to include exclusively occuring non-textual features like specific
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phrases, over-emphasized punctuation etc. These features should also be treated as
‘strong’ evidence.
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Chapter 4 – Measurements
4.1 Methodology
We use the parameters of precision and recall for measurement of the accuracy of the
algorithm. Spam precision is the percentage of messages in the test data classified as
spam that actually are spam. Spam recall is the proportion of messages in the test data
correctly classified as spam to the total number of spam messages in the test data. Spam
precision gives us the accuracy of the filter with respect to false positives and spam recall
demonstrates the capacity of the filter to catch spam.

For our measurements, we downloaded a corpus of 5538 unique spam mails from the
http://www.spamarchive.org website and used 960 legitimate mails from Eugene Fink’s
mailbox. We performed experiments using K-fold cross validation for two values of K:
K=5 and K=2 . We used smaller values of K so that the error estimate is pessimistically
biased i.e. the algorithm faces a harder accuracy test than 10-fold cross validation.

For K= 5, the corpus of spam and legitimate messages is divided into five equal-sized
sets and four are used for training and the last one is used for testing. Five such runs are
carried out each time using one different testing set and four remaining sets for training.
Accuracy values for these five runs are averaged out to get the final values.
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For K= 2, the corpus of spam and legitimate messages is divided into two equal-sized
sets and one set is used for training and the other set is used for testing. The testing and
training sets are then swapped and another run is carried out. Accuracy values for
these two runs are averaged out to get the final values.

4.2 Comparison with Naïve-Bayes
Naïve-Bayes is currently the most popular algorithm for junk mail classification. For
benchmarking the ‘scavenger’ algorithm against naïve-bayes, we implemented the
algorithm in Paul Graham’s popular ‘A Plan for Spam’ ([8]) and tested it using K-fold
cross validation for the same data set. We implemented the algorithm for two separate
methods of feature extraction. In one method, we used words+phrases as features. In the
other method, mechanism of feature extraction was same as the ‘scavenger’ algorithm.
For both the methods, weight assignment and combining of weights was implemented as
given in Graham’s algorithm. In implementing the two variations of Graham’s algorithm,
we did not use message headers during feature extraction so that the data from which
features are extracted remains the same for ‘scavenger’ as well as for naïve-bayes.

Value of M, the thresold parameter, was kept at 1. 0.9 was assigned as the weight for
‘strong’ evidence and 0.1 was assigned as the weight for ‘weak’ evidence.
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Table 1 gives the results of our experiments.

Table 1: Comparison with Naïve-Bayes
ALGORITHM

K=5
SPAM
PRECISION
(AVERAGE)
Scavenger (M=1) 100%
Naïve-bayes
100%
(words+phrases)
100%
Naïve-bayes
(with scavenger
feature extraction
method)

K=2
SPAM
SPAM
PRECISION
RECALL
(AVERAGE) (AVERAGE)
99.85%
99.92%
98.87%
99.80%

SPAM
RECALL
(AVERAGE)
99.72%
97.03%

99.15%

98.68%

99.65%

As we see in the table, ‘scavenger’ gives a better performance over both the versions of
naïve-bayes in terms of both spam precision and spam recall, especially for K=2.

On examination of the logs of extracted features for naïve-bayes, we find that most of the
features selected during classification have probability values equal or close to 0.01 or
0.99. In the absence of any heuristics-based discrimination, 0.01 or 0.99 values get
assigned to unimportant pieces of evidence. Thus, it becomes a simple race between
which class (spam or legitimate) has more number of matching features and the class
with more number of matching features ‘wins’.
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On the other hand, the ‘scavenger’ algorithm has:
1. A powerful feature extraction technique that is able to collect and use a huge
amount of quantity of evidence.
2. Usage of heuristic rules in addition to the frequency of occurrence of features to
determine the quality of evidence. This serves to clearly discriminate between
important and unimporant pieces of evidence.

We can infer that while using a powerful feature extraction technique as in ‘scavenger’ or
as in Yerazunis’s CRM114 ([9]), the heuristics based discrimination between important
and unimportant pieces of evidence would lend more accuracy to classification.

4.3 Experiments on M, the Thresold Parameter
We performed another set of experiments for plotting the ROC curve by varying the
value of M from 0.25 to 2.5. Weights for ‘strong’ evidence and ‘weak’ evidence were
kept at 0.9 and 0.1. We used K-fold cross validation for each value of M, keeping the
value K at 2. Table 2 shows the results for this experiment. Figure 3.1 shows the ROC
curve obtained by plotting the average percentage values of missed spam against the
average percentage values of false positives for the various values of M.

The curve shows that as we increase the value of M, the effect on missed spam is very
small but the effect on false positives is quite significant. For M=2, M=2.25 and M=2.5,
we got zero false positives with a very high value of recall. Thus, values of M between 2
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and 2.5 should be considered as ‘safe’ values for the algorithm. In section 4.4, we shall
investigate a mechanism to automatically set the value of M during the training phase.

Table 2: Accuracy for Various Values of M
M

Missed
Spam
(%)
0
0.07
0.11
0.28
0.3
0.35
0.41
0.49
0.6
0.74

0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1.25
1.5
1.75
2
2.25
2.5

Spam
Recall
(%)
100
99.93
99.89
99.72
99.70
99.66
99.59
99.51
99.4
99.36

False
Positives
(%)
13.23
6.17
2.05
0.58
0.58
0.58
0.29
0
0
0

Spam
Precision
(%)
98.35
99.22
99.74
99.92
99.92
99.92
99.96
100
100
100

ROC Curve: Missed Spam Rate VS False Positive Rate

False Positive Rate (%)

14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0

0.07

0.11

0.28

0.3

0.34

0.41

Missed Spam Rate (%)

Figure 1: ROC Curve
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0.49

0.6

0.74

4.4 Choosing the best set of weights
To experimentally determine the best set of weights to represent ‘strong’ and ‘weak’
evidences, we perform experiments where value of ‘strong’ evidence is kept at 0.9 and
value of ‘weak’ evidence is varied from 0.1 to 0.9 in steps of 0.1. Value of M is kept at 2.

Table 3 shows the accuracy measurements for the selected weight combinations of strong
and weak evidences.

Table 3: Accuracy for Different Sets of Weights
Weights for
strong
evidence
/weak
evidence
0.9/0.1
0.9/0.2
0.9/0.3
0.9/0.4
0.9/0.5
0.9/0.6
0.9/0.7
0.9/0.8
0.9/0.9

Missed
Spam (%)

False
Positives
(%)

Spam
Recall
(%)

Spam
Precision
(%)

0.49
0.46
0.41
0.37
0.36
0.36
0.30
0.30
0.30

0
0
0
0
0
0
0.88
0.88
0.88

99.51
99.54
99.59
99.63
99.64
99.64
99.70
99.70
99.70

100
100
100
100
100
100
99.88
99.88
99.88

Weight Combination of 0.9/0.6 gave zero false positives and a missed spam rate of 0.36.
Although weight combinations 0.9/0.7, 0.9/0.8 amd 0.9/0.9 gave a lower missed spam
rate, rate of false positives was non-zero in these cases.
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4.5 The TUNE Strategy
Bill Yerazunis has written about the increased accuracy obtained by using the ‘Train until
no errors’ (TUNE) strategy ([18]). We attempted to apply the TUNE strategy to
automatically set the thresold parameter M for the ‘scavenger’ algorithm. However, while
applying the TUNE strategy, time required for training becomes very large since training
iterations have to be repeated over all the messages in the training set until we get
accuracy rate to the desired level or until a fixed number of iterations are over because of
the uncertainty of convergence.

As we saw in section 4.3, increasing the value of M has a very small impact on the spam
filtering rate but a significant impact on the rate of false positives. We use this
experimental evidence to implement an alternative method for TUNE. The Training
process is modified as follows:

1. In the first pass, extract features and store them in a hash table in memory as
described in section 3.2. Assign weights 0.9 and 0.6 to features for ‘strong’ and
‘weak’ evidences. M is initially kept at 2.
2. In the next pass, validate only the set of legitimate messages in the training set.
Increase M by an increment of 0.1 if there are any false positives.
3. In subsequent passes, validate only the false positives from the previous passes.
Since we are increasing M on each iteration, it is not necessary to validate all
previous correctly classified legitimate messages again.
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4. Terminate when all legitimate messages are classified correctly or when the value
of M reaches 2.5, whichever is earlier.
By using this variation of TUNE strategy, we 1> ensure that the training process
converges quickly and 2> give priority to reducing the risk for false positives.
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Chapter 5 – Implementation
We have created a windows PC-based spam filter that operates for individual email
accounts on IMAP mail servers. The filter classifier runs as a windows service on a
Windows NT/2000/XP PC.
The filter has three main modules:

1. The configuration program: This module collects configuration data like the IP
address of the mail server, account name, legitimate folders, Junk mail folders etc.
and stores it in a text file in the installation directory on the PC.
2. The training program: This program is used for training the filter on the messages
in the legitimate and spam folders selected by the user during configuration.
3. The classification service: This service is the actual classifier that runs as a
windows service.

To connect to the mail server and to perform operations on mailboxes and messages, we
have used email COM objects from quiksoft (http://www.quiksoft.com). The primary
purpose of using these objects is the convenience in distinguishing between read and
unread messages, parsing MIME parts of the messages as well the ease of reading
headers, subject and the body of each message separately. Moreover, the objects can
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convert from different encodings into the standard 7-bit ascii thus presenting the textual
content in a uniform manner.

5.1 Configuration Program
Spamconfig.exe in the installation/spamconfig directory is the configuration program.
Figure 5.1 shows the main screen, called ‘Configuration screen’ of the program.
IP address of the mail server, account name, password, mail subdirectory, location, name
of the Inbox file and the name of the user are collected and stored in a text file in the
installation directory.

Figure 2: Main Screen for Configuration
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On clicking the NEXT button, screen shown in figure 5.2 is displayed.

Figure 3: Selection of Folders for Training

All folders in the user’s mailbox account are listed in the list on the left. The user can
select legitimate folders and spam folders to be used for training. Spam classification
folder is the folder where spam mail would be stored after classification. The Sent-Mail
folder is used as a legitimate folder for training. On clicking ‘Save’, the information is
saved in text files in the installation directory on the PC.
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5.2 Training Program
Spamtrain.exe is used to train the filter on the legitimate and the spam folders selected
during configuration.
On running spamtrain.exe, the screen shown in Figure 5.3 is displayed. Folders selected
for training are shown for confirmation in the ‘legitimate folders’ and ‘spam folders’ lists.
On entering the password and clicking ‘Start Training’, the training process is started.

Figure 4: Main Screen for Training
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A screen containing a progress bar is displayed. The progress bar indicates the progress
of the training (in Figure 5.4). Once feature extraction is over, subsequent passes over the
training set validate the legitimate messages for implementing the TUNE strategy.

The training process also collects legitimate and spam email addresses from the training
folders. Once training is over, the entire hash table of features is written onto the
occurcount sub-directory in the installation directory. Legitimate addresses are written
onto the legitaddr and the spam addresses are written onto the spamaddr sub-directories.

Figure 5: Progress of Training During Feature Extraction
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5.4 Classification Service
The classifier runs as a Windows Service which connects to the mail server every 10
minutes, downloads new messages, classifies them and stores messages classified as
spam into the spam classification folder.
Before usage, the service sclassify.exe has to be installed by running the SControl.exe
program, shown in Figure 5.5. The screen asks for the account name and the password
under which the service would run. This account has to have Administrator privileges for
the PC.
‘Install Service’ will install and ‘Start Service’ will start the service. Service can also be
started through the Services applet in the Control Panel of the PC. Once the service has
been started, it can be stopped either through the Services applet or by running the
SControl.exe program and clicking the ‘Stop Service’ button (Figure 5.6).
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Figure 6: Installing the Service
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Figure 7: Uninstalling the Service

During the classification, the address from which the mail has arrived is matched in the
addresses stored in the legitaddr and the spamaddr directories. If there is a match in the
legitaddr list or in the spamaddr list, then the message is classified as legitimate or spam
respectively and the classification algorithm is not applied. Classification algorithm is
applied only if no match is found in the list of legitimate and spam addresses.
We turned ‘off’ the address-matching mechanism while testing the classification
algorithm. Thus, all measurements in Chapter 4 were done using the content-based
classification algorithm.
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Chapter 6 – Conclusions and Future Work
We started our research by recognizing the three steps of feature extraction, weight
assignment and weight combination used by learning algorithms for spam classification.
We created a new learning algorithm which implements a unique mechanism for each of
the three steps and improves accuracy for spam classification over the popular naïvebayes algorithm. Features are created from individual sentences of messages by forming
all possible word-pairings from a sentence. Discrete weights are assigned to the features
based on the strength of their predictive capabilities for spam/legitimate determination.
This predictive strength is based on the frequency of occurrence of the feature in
spam/legitimate collections as well as on heuristic rules. During classification, total spam
and legitimate evidence in the message is obtained by summing up the weights of
extracted features of each class and the message is classified into whichever class
accumulates the greater sum.

We defined the concept of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ evidences and listed rules to categorize
features into these classes. We empirically determined the best set of weights to assign to
features in these two categories. We also defined a thresold parameter to trade-off
between the number of false positives and the number of uncaught spam mails. We
applied the TUNE (Train until no errors) strategy to auto-set the value of the thresold
parameter during training.
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The algorithm is implemented on Windows. The implementation uses third-party COM
objects to download messages from IMAP mail servers and perform all other operations
on messages.

Future improvements to the algorithm include:
1. Use of message headers during the feature extraction step.
2. Use of domain-specific attributes of spam during the weight combination step.
3. Identification of more heuristic rules to separate ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ evidences.
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